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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD 0. BJORK, HERMAN A.
BJORK, BEATRICE A. WILCOX
and ARTHUR ANDERSON,

CASE NO.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

14143

vs,
APRIL INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
HAROLD 0. BJORK, HERMAN A. BJORK,
BEATRICE A. WILCOX and ARTHUR ANDERSON

There are two obvious omissions in April's analysis
of the case in its brief.

First, it utterly disregards

the problem its inconsistent positions created, asserting,
on one hand, that the shares and the registration agreement are void, and on the other, contending plaintiffs
should have sold.

April does not explain how it or the

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial court could logically have required plaintiffs to
sell or attempt to sell restricted shares that April said
were invalid.

Such a position requires plaintiffs to per-

form either useless or impossible acts.

Second, April

has shown no evidence of any intentional relinquishment
of registration rights.
When April failed to register the shares, the breach
of contract occurred and damage accrued.

Damage would not

have been avoided nor minimized by more contact by plaintiffs with April than in fact occurred, because April would
not have recognized the restricted shares, nor permitted
the transfer thereof.
We shall analyze April's brief in detail, giving reference to the page numbers of its brief wherein the point is
asserted.

POINT

I

PLAINTIFFS DESIRED TO SELL
The SEC gives a peculiar connotation to the term
"registration."

Instead of involving the type of things

which unsophisticated persons might expect, such as filing
the stock certificate in a registrar's office, getting a
designated registration number, etc., the SEC deems stock
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to be "registered" if there is a "prospectus" describing
it.

Such SEC parlance is hardly that with which laymen

might be expected to be conversant.

April states that

those plaintiffs who received the preliminary and final
prospectus (excluding Arthur Anderson, who didn't receive
them) clearly understood them (p.4).
nor finding to that effect.

There is no evidence

There was a finding that

they were aware or should have been aware of the agreement,
but none that they understood the prospectus.

The evi-

dence is to the contrary, showing lack of understanding
(R.226,227,357,358,364).
April argues that the court found that plaintiffs
did not really want to include their shares in the public
offering (p.5).

The finding of the court related to their

desires to sell, rather than their desires to have their
shares included in the public offering.

Not only was

there evidence that each subjectively had the desire to
sell, there also was objective evidence of many attempts
by various plaintiffs to get freely tradeable shares
and to sell, such as contacting the SEC, various brokers,
April's president, and April's attorney.

The quoted

portions of some of the plaintiffs' testimony (p.9-11)
simply show that the plaintiffs made no demand for dam-

See plaintiffs' original brief pages 8 - 13.
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ages between the time of the breach of the registration
agreement and the commencement of suit; during which
time, however, the contacts above referred to with
brokers, the SEC, April and Aprilfs attorney were made.
April states that the fact that the plaintiffs
awaited the outcome of Lowe's suit indicates that they
did not care about their registration rights (p.8).
To the contrary, it shows that when Lowe's case was
decided, they then had some assurance that April's
assertion that the directors' registration rights were
void would not be sustained in court.

POINT

II

THERE WAS NO WAIVER
This court said in Phoenix Insurance Company vs. Heath,
90 U 187, 61 P2d 308,311, cited in our original brief:
We cannot find ... any waiver of plaintiff's
rights as found by the trial court. A
waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right, 27 R.CL. 904. To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge
of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied."
(emphasis added)
The court there could find no waiver and reversed, as
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the court should do here.
The trial court here concluded that plaintiffs were
aware "or should have been aware of the scope and effect
of their agreement," and that plaintiffs

,f

were aware or

are charged with an awareness of their legal rights under
the agreement and they effectively waived those rights"
(R. 154). These conclusions of law were in the alternative, showing that the trial court concluded that it
was plaintiffs' duty to be aware of their rights and
that there could be a waiver of rights of which they
should have been aware, but were not.

This is at odds

with the rule as set forth in Phoenix.
The trial court's decision is hinged upon the premise that plaintiffs had the affirmative duty to actively
assert their rights by making demandfor registration
prior to the commencement of suit.
Theiequitable part of plaintiffs' claim, wherein
it is asserted that they are presently entitled to freely
tradeable shares, has been decided in plaintiffs' favor.
There is no cross appeal and, therefore, no issue thereon.
The legal portion of plaintiffs' claim, wherein they are

See also Mitchell vs. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J.
Superior 396, 137 A.2d 569,573, wherein the requirements
for waiver were expressed as being a "voluntary relinquishment of a known right evidenced by a clear, unequivocal and decisive act showing an intent to relinquish."
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claiming damages for failure of April to register is now
before this court.

This court, therefore, is not dealing

with equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel, but only
the legal doctrine of waiver.
The evidence is insufficient for the trial court to
have determined that there was waiver.

The trial court

ignored the evidence before it of desire to sell.

Mrs.

Wilcox and Herman Bjork were in touch with April, trying
3
to sell their shares.
The fact that there is no evidence
that either Harold Bjork or Anderson contacted April would,
at most, constitute silence or inaction on their part.
The case of Voelker vs. Joseph, 62 Wash.2d 429, 383 P2d
301, 305, is a case involving inaction by a party and nonassertion of his rights.

The language of the Washington

court is applicable tc this case.

The court in discussing

implied waiver by silence said:
ff

There is, however, substantial merit in one contention of the appellant, and this requires the
granting of a new trial. The trial court instructed
the jury that a right may be waived impliedly by a
party who neglects to insist upon it. The evidence
was that the appellant did not make an immediate
claim that the offsets which the respondents'
customers demanded should not be deducted from the
payments made to him by the respondents, and in
fact indicated that he was not surprised that
damaged apples had appeared, although he did not
admit the responsibility for the defects. The
six-year statute of limitations applied to his
cause of action, and he did not file suit until
nearly five of these years had elapsed. While
the respondents state that they were prejudiced
by this inaction, they do not state wherein the

See plaintiffs1 original brief pages 8 - 13.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the prejudice lay. No doubt, they were inconvenienced, but this type of inconvenience attends
the delay of any suit within the statutory period
of limitations. The legislature has decreed
what shall be reasonable time within which to
bring suit, and it cannot be said that the mere
failure to bring suit constitutes a waiver of
the right of action, so long as suit is brought
within the statutory period . . .
Insofar as our research has disclosed, the
courts invoke the doctrine of implied waiver
by silence or acquiescence only where a forfeiture would otherwise result. There is no question
of forfeiture before us here.
In this case, there was no showing that the
appellant had knowledge of all of the facts at
the time the deductions were made from payments
on his account or that the circumstances existing
at that time required him to protest; no showing
the he expressly waived the right to payment of
the balance; and no showing that the respondents
were prejudiced by his failure to assert this
right.f!
As said in 92 CJS, Waiver 1064:
"A waiver may arise or be implied from the
acquiescence or silence of the party who has
the power of waiving, under circumstances which
require him to speak, but silence to constitute
a waiver, must be deceptive silence, and it
must be accompanied by an intention to defraud
which amounts to a positive beguilement. Mere
silence is never a waiver, when there is no duty
or occasion to speak; and where such silence is
unaccompanied by any act calculated to mislead,
and in the absence of conduct amounting to an
estoppel, there is no waiver." (emphasis added)
See also 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, par. 160.
There was no evidence that April was prejudiced by
any inaction of any plaintiff, nor that there was fraud,
beguilement nor deception.

In fact, insofar as deception

is concerned, April stated that had it been "aware" of

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the rights of plaintiffs "the company would have asserted
the invalidity of both the issuance of the stock and the
issuance of the registration rights" (R.109), as it in
fact did.
April argues that the restrictive legend on the shares
provided that they could not be sold without a registration
statement or opinion of counsel, satisfactory to the issuer,
that registration was not required; and concludes that, had
plaintiffs wanted to sell, they should have sought advice
from an attorney (p.12).

The response to this varies some-

what for each of the plaintiffs.

Some sought the counsel

and opinion of persons familiar with stock transactions,
their brokers.

"Counsel" in its broader sense is not

limited to attorneys.

Mrs. Wilcox's broker consulted April's

attorney (R.301,309), who should have been "counsel satisfactory to the issuer."

However, all plaintiffs would

have been unsuccessful in having April agree that the shares
were tradeable, regardless of any attorney's opinion which
any plaintiff might have furnished because April contended
that the shares were void.(R.109).
"The law does not require the doing of a vain or
useless act, nor does the failure to do such act
constitute a waiver of legal rights, or defeat a
right otherwise conditioned on such act." Title
and Trust Company vs. Durkheimer, 155 Ore. 427,
63 P2d 909,91$.
April contends that the court was justified in thinking

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that Mrs. Wilcox followed Parker's suggestion to hang on
to the stock foV it would be "worth a lot of money'1
(p.12).

April is doing just what the trial court did

in taking evidence out of context, because, as shown in
our original brief, after that advice was given to Mrs.
Wilcox, she made many attempts to have the shares made
4
tradeable and to sell.
April asserts that there is no showing that it knew
about the "claimed right of any of these particular
plaintiffs" (p.13).

Such a contention is inconceivable.

Plaintiffs and Lowe were the only officers of the pre- r
decessor company.

Parker's lawyer suggested that there

be a piggy-back registration.

Parker became president

and director and the lawyer became counsel for the company
and

a

director.

Furthermore, Lowe's letter to April

(Ex.l3P) which the court refused to admit in one instance,
but which, nevertheless was admitted in a deposition which
was made a part of the record stated:
"I notice that there is no attempt made to
register the restricted shares that I have
and other officers of the original company
and my partner, Andrew R. Hurley, have, which
by the agreement, a copy of which I sent in
my letter of August 6th, were to be registered."
The company couldn't have been blissfully ignorant
of its obligation to plaintiffs.

See also Plaintiffs' original brief page 9.
See also Plaintiffs' original brief page 4.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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April then contends that it could reasonably have believed that plaintiffs did not wish to have their shares included in the public offering (p.13).

April was hardly

misled in light of the above quoted letter.
April attempts to distinguish between this case and
the Lowe case by saying first that Lowe demanded that April
include his and Hurley's shares in the registration statement (p.13, note 4). The demand in the Lowe case was the
identical demand which was made in this case, i.e. Lowe's
letter quoted above, referring to the failure to include
restricted shares of all plaintiffs.

The other attempted

distinction is that April claims that the Lowe case is
replete with contacts he made with April concerning ways
to settle the controversy (p.13, note 9). There is no
rule of law requiring a claimant to negotiate for settlement of any breach of an agreement.
April asserts that plaintiffs had reasons for not selling, contending that, since the stock rose from the public
offering price of $13 to a later price of $14 before dropping to 75 cents, that the court could have inferred that
plaintiffs did not wish to sell at $13 (p.13).

It does

not take such an application of hindsight to illustrate
that stock prices go up and down.
would fluctuate.

Of course, the quotes

The efforts of plaintiffs to get freely
-10-
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tradeable shares and to sell their restricted shares and
the sale by them of their tradeable shares negate the
argument that plaintiffs did not wish to sell.
April argues that the court could have found that
plaintiffs had abandoned their rights to registration
(p.14).

The court did not find abandonment, but based

its ruling upon the related doctrine of waiver.

The

authorities cited by April in support of the concept of
abandonment are distinguishable.

They all involve

affirmative inconsistent acts by the plaintiff who thereby
abandons his right to enforce the contract.

None involves

mere delay in asserting rights, which is the most that
April claims here.
' ' ' . '
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. vs. Harper,
U
,
P2d~
j Case No. 13936 filed December 3, 1975.
In Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 18 U2d 368, 423 P2d 491 "
(1967), the parties had entered into an earnest money receipt for the sale of realty, which provided that on or
before a given date a contract of sale would be drawn up,
which was never done. This constituted abandonment. No
such situation exists here. In King vs. Firm, 3 U2d 419,
285 P2d 1114 (1955), there were two sets of notes and
mortgages. The plaintiff released the earlier set, with
a recitation in the release referring to the later set as
being "unused papers," indicating the parties had never
used the later set, nor intended that they be effective.
He was held to have abandoned his right's in the later set.
No such situation exists here.
The language April quotes from the superseded 12 Am.
Jur., Contracts, par. 442, is taken from a section entitled
"Repudiation of Contract as Grounds for Rescission." It
involves the determination that if a party wrongfully repudiates a contract that the other party is then entitled
to rescind. Such is not involved here. Ours is a unilateral
contract. Plaintiffs had already performed and were under
no further duty of performance and therefore could not
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

April contends that plaintiffs had essentially an
f,

optionM to have their shares included in a public offering

(p.15).

This is a deliberate misconstruction of the language

of the agreement sued upon, which provides that the company...
"Agrees with stockholders that if the company
files a registration statement in the future
for the transfer of shares other than those
represented by the certificate issued to the
above named stockholders, the company will
include these shares in such registration
statement" (Ex.2D).
There is no option involved. It is a firm obligation, not

x

dependent upon any election to be exercised on the part of
plaintiffs.
wrongfully repudiate.
The corresponding section in the second edition of
American Jurisprudence is 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, par. 505,
in which it is even more clearly pointed out that what is
being discussed is wrongful repudiation and refusal to perform. The quoted section now reads:
"Repudiation or renunciation. As a general rule,
the rescission of a contract by one party thereto
is permitted for the other party's repudiation of
the contract or any essential part of it. Thus,
it is well settled that a party may so wrongfully
repudiate the contract as to authorize the other
to renounce and rescind it, as where the conduct
of one of the parties evinces an intention no longer
to be bound by the contract." (emphasis added)
Plaintiffs here did not renounce and did not wrongfully repudiate any obligation.
The cases cited by American Jurisprudence show that
its quoted language refers to a situation in which there
is a bilateral rather than unilateral contract. The "inconsistent" conduct referred to is the conduct of a wrongfully repudiating party, who then seeks to enforce the contract after the other party has acquiesced in the repudiation.
That did not occur here.
-12-
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April states that the trial court found that plaintiffs decided not to exercise their "option11 (p. 15).
The trial court found no such thing.

To the contrary,

it expressly faund that there was the above quoted
.:-... "agreement11 (R.151).
April argues that it would be bad public policy to
permit plaintiffs to sue at any time within the six-year
statute of limitations period for a breach of contract
(p.15).

If April had recognized the validity of the

-A stock, and had there been alternative ways of making
the shares saleable, of which plaintiffs should reasonably
have been aware, then the principal of "cover,ff which
April so strenuously asserts would indeed have been app~ licable.

Plaintiffs would then have been limited in the

amount of their recovery by the price at which they could
have sold within a reasonable time after the breach, as
set forth in the citations of April (p.16).

That, how-

ever, would not, as contended by April (p.16), bar the
action, which could be brought at any time during the sixyear limitation period.

If it is bad public policy to

permit the bringing of a suit for breach of a written contract within a six-year period, the legislature, not this
court, should shorten the limitation period.
The cases cited by April on mitigation of damages
are distinguishable:

In Galigher vs. Jones, 179 U.S.
-13-
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193, 9 S.Ct. 335, 32 L.Ed 658 (1889) there was conversion
of stock which the court required the plaintiff to replace
within a reasonable time, awarding damages based on the
price of the stock within said reasonable time period.

In

Clements vs. Mueller, 41 F2d 41 (9th Circ. 1930) damages
were claimed for refusal of defendant to sell its stock to
plaintiff.

Plaintiff could have covered by buying other

stock within said reasonable time and damages were based
upon prices within said reasonable time period.

Reynolds

vs. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, 309 F.Supp. 548 (D.Utah
1970) involved a false news release which minimized the
importance of a publicized ore strike, relying on which
the plaintiffs sold.

Plaintiff could have repurchased

other shares within a reasonable time and damages were
based on prices within said reasonable time period.

The

distinction is that, in those cases the plaintiffs had
the ability to mitigate, whereas in the instant case,
plaintiffs, wanting to sell, had no means to do so because
April would not recognize the validity of their stock.
April says that it:
"Presented considerable evidence of how plaintiffs
might have minimized their damages through the use
of either an opinion letter or of Rule 144M (p.16).
April completely ignores, and makes no attempt to rebut,
the showing in our original brief that both an opinion letter
and Rule 144 were and are unavailable to plaintiffs so long
-14-
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as April asserts that plaintiffs1 stock is void.

•:3

—

POINT

III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR
April argues that it was not error to refuse to admit into evidence Exhibit 13P (p.17).

It characterizes

the letter as one demanding that April include the shares
of Lowe and Hurley in a public offering, again ignoring
the fact that the letter referred to shares of "other
officers of the original company'1 (Ex.l3P).

April con-

tends that "there is nothing in the language of the letter
to indicate that it was written on behalf of any of the
plaintiffs" (p.18).

The language of Ex.l3P, referring

to stock owned by the "other officers>" shows that is
just not so. April's contention that none of the plaintiffs knew of the existence of the letter and that they
had not authorized nor approved thereof (p.18), is only
true as of the date the letter was written.

They offered

to prove their subsequent knowledge of it and their approval thereof (R.210-215,237,266,289), which offer was rejected.
April argues that the letter should not have been
admitted because there was "no proof offered that Mr.

See also Plaintiffs1 original brief pages 26
and 32.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lowe was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs at the time he
wrote the letter" (p.18).

The letter speaks for itself,

that he was purporting to act on their behalf.
April contends that there was no evidence that "plaintiffs understood the letter to be sent on their behalf"
(p.18).

They cite the Restatement of Agency, Second 82.

The Restatement does not require evidence of the principal's
"understanding."

The letter was expressly written on

plaintiffs' behalf.

The letter is clear and was obviously

intended to remind April that plaintiffs' shares should be
registered.

Since the court did not permit plaintiffs'

testimony as to ratification to be introduced, it erroneously
ignored the effect of ratification.
There is no "implausible" theory of agency, as contended
by April (p.19), but a logical feeling on the part of plaintiffs, that if a reminder had already been given to April on
their behalf prior to the issuance of the final prospectus,
there would be nothing gained by further complaints to April,
after it had breached the agreement by refusing to register.
Plaintiffs tendered their shares into court for delivery
to April and proffered to treat April's conduct as a conversion, thereby giving up their shares.
April's objection thereto (R.381).

The court sustained

This left plaintiffs

in possession of their unsaleable shares.

April argues that

the fact that plaintiffs still have their restricted shares
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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puts them in an unconscionable position.

True, as April

points out, the shares may go up, but they may also go
down further.

April is only showing one side of the coin

in saying if the stock goes up, plaintiffs will be subsequently benefited.

If it goes down before they can sell,

they will have lost more than the amount prayed for in
this action, because there has to be some cut-off point
for ascertaining damages for breach of the agreement to
register.

We fail to see how April can say that plain-

tiffs were "unwilling" to give up their stock when they
tendered It into court and defendant refused to take it.
Nor, can we see how April can logically argue that such
"unwillingness" was "the reason the trial court judge
felt that they had waived their rights" (p.20).
April objects that plaintiffs "wanted to keep the
stock and obtain damages" for failure to include the shares
in the offering (p.19).

Such a position is not unusual.

Had the agreement here been one for sale of the stock, in
an action for damages for.breach thereof, plaintiffs would
keep their shares while suing for damages.
might go up or down.

The shares

In that case, damages would be

determined by the difference between the agreed price and
the price for which the seller would have resold within
a reasonable time after the breach, thus limiting the
time within which market flucuation might add to.or dimin-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ish the amount of damages.

Here, where the agreement in-

volved is to make the shares saleable, April's breach (which
prevents plaintiffs from having marketable shares) prevents
the application of a "reasonable time period" in which to
dispose of the shares, thereby lengthening the time until
the date of trial in which market fluctuation might increase
or decrease damages.
April argues that it is not presently refusing to recognize plaintiffs' position as shareholders, despite its
rejection of plaintiffs' second tender of shares to accomplish the exchange for tradeable shares as ordered in the
decree.

April's response to this second tender was to the

effect that it won't recognize plaintiffs' shares because
plaintiffs have appealed (R.123-124).

Plaintiffs have not

appealed from the only favorable part of the lower court's
judgment; that they are entitled to freely tradeable shares.
On the other hand, April in its brief, could have cross
appealed, asserting that the court erred in ruling that the
shares were valid and that plaintiffs were entitled to tradeable shares.

April states that:

"Though it has reservations about the propriety
of the order requiring it to issue the shares
without restrictive legends, defendant will comply with that order as soon as all appeal periods
have expired." (p.2).
Even now that it has not cross appealed, and there is,
therefore, no issue as to whether or not the court's order
-18-
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that the shares be recognized is binding, April is contending that plaintiffs should not presently have tradeable shares and that they must await the decision on
this appealj which decision will have nothing to do
with the validity of the order to make the shares tradeable.

In other words, April is still refusing to recog-

nize that plaintiffs are entitled to valid, tradeable
shares.
April states that if plaintiffs presently sold their
shares, plaintiffs would probably be violating "applicable
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 through improper
public sale of restricted stock" (p.20, note 11), thus recognizing that even now plaintiffs can't sell.
This court held in the Lowe case that if April were
going to rescind because of alleged fraud, etc., it had
to act promptly.

April, in its conclusion, argues that

plaintiffs here are in a similar position to that of
April, there (p.21).

It is an equitable rule which re-

quires prompt election to rescind or affirm upon discovery
of fraud, as held in Perry vs. Woodall, 20 U2d 309, 438
P2d 813.

Such rule of equity is inapplicable in an action

at law for damages for breach of contract.

CONCLUSION
One of Aprilfs few valid contentions is that plainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tiffs did not, after the agreement to register was breached
and before suit, complain to April nor attempt to negotiate
a compromise solution.

But no such duties to complain or

negotiate are imposed upon one claiming damages for breach
of contract.

Plaintiffs must bring an action within the

period of the statute of limitation, which period should
not be shortened by an argument that public policy will
best be served by requiring them to act sooner.
Lowe had asked for performance of the obligation to
register plaintiffs' shares.

Lowe, in his suit, had been

met with the defense that directors1 shares were void.
Plaintiffs knew that.

^

If Lowe's shares were void, plain-

tiffs' shares were void.

Consultations by two of the

plaintiffs with April as to how to sell the shares accomplished
nothing.

Awaiting the outcome of Lowe's suit as to validity

of the shares and of the agreement to register, and deciding
to sue when April's contention of invalidity was rejected
by the court, was reasonable action on plaintiffs' part.
There was no indication that plaintiffs knowingly and
intentionally waived any right, and even less, was there
clear and convincing evidence thereof.

Plaintiffs, although

in like positions in that they each had restricted shares,
were not acting in concert.

The attempts to sell were through

their separate brokers, each plaintiff using his own.

Con-

tacts with the SEC, with April's officers, and with April's
-20Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attorney were separate and different.

Waiver cannot be

based on negligence, inattention, or inadvertence.

There

is no evidence that any one of the plaintiffs knowingly
and intentionally relinquished his rights, much less
that each one of them did.

It is unlikely that anyone

would want to give up the valuable right to get marketable shares.

It is highly unlikely that four persons,

acting independently, with different contacts, would each
come to a decision that he wanted to waive his valuable
rights.

The evidence is to the contrary, that each

wanted to sell.
The court should remand, with instructions, to award
damages.
Respectfully submitted,

John W. Lowe
Brayton, Lowe § Hurley
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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